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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
one case,27 the court went so far as to hold the bank liable to the
beneficiary of trust funds deposited with it, merely because the bank
was found to have had constructive knowledge of misappropriation by
the wife of the trustee. Moreover, the banks themselves consider that
they have a greater responsibility to protect their depositors than do
other business concerns, particularly where, as in the principal case,
the depositor is also a borrower from the bank.28 This may result
from a recognition of the bank's special status, which has been de-
scribed as semi-public 29 or quasi-public, 30 and affected with a public
interest.81
Perhaps some of the difficulty involved in determining whether
an action against a bank is in contract or in tort has been due to an
inability to categorize or name the action. Regardless of the label,32
however, it appears that the gravamen of such an action is a breach
of a duty of care imposed by the banker-depositor relationship. There-
fore, the conclusion reached by the minority, that a good cause of
action in tort could here be pleaded, seems to be the correct one.
)X
CORPORATIONS - ADVERSE JUDGMENT NOT REQUIRED TO DENY
DIRECTOR REIMBURSEMENT FOR LITIGATION EXPENSES. -A stock-
holder's derivative action was brought by one of the two stockholders
of a corporation against the other, as director, for corporate miscon-
duct. The complaint was dismissed on a finding that the plaintiff
participated in and ratified the misconduct of the defendant. On mo-
399 (1891) ; Commisso v. National City Bank, 174 Misc. 409, 413, 21 N.Y.S.2d
187, 191 (Sup. Ct. 1939), aff'd mere., 259 App. Div. 891, 20 N.Y.S2d 1007 (2d
Dep't), motion for leave to appeal denied, 284 N.Y. 817, 29 N.E.2d 396 (1940).27 Lee v. Corn Exchange Bank Trust Co., 270 App. Div. 2, 58 N.Y.S.2d 290
(2d Dep't 1945), aff'd mer., 295 N.Y. 945, 68 N.E.2d 43 (1946).
28 See CHAPIN, CREDIT AND COLLECTION PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE 282-284
(5th ed. 1947) (This is evident from the banking practice of attempting to
restrict the dissemination of credit information; credit men from mercantile
houses, on the other hand, are much less reserved in dispensing credit infor-
mation regarding those with whom they do business.).29 Id. at 283.30 See, e.g., German Baptist Orphans' Home v. Union Banking Co., 13 F.
Supp. 814, 816 (W.D. Mich. 1935); Citizens' Bank & Trust Co. v. Mabry, 102
Fla. 1084, 136 So. 714, 716 (1931); Priest v. Whitney Loan & Trust Co., 219
Iowa 1281, 261 N.W. 374, 377 (1935).
31 See, e.g., In re Thornton, 7 F. Supp. 613, 614 (D. Colo. 1934) ; Dyer v.
Broadway Central Bank, 225 App. Div. 366, 367, 233 N.Y. Supp. 96, 97 (1st
Dep't 1929), revd on other grounds, 252 N.Y. 430, 169 N.E. 635 (1930) ; Hoff
v. First State Bank, 174 Minn. 36, 218 N.W. 238, 241 (1928).
32 "There is no necessity whatever that a tort must have a name." PRossER,
TORTS 4-5 (1941).
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tion for assessment of expenses against the corporation, pursuant to
Section 64 of the General Corporation Law, the trial court awarded
the defendant $30,000. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court
of Appeals reversed the allowance for expenses and held that it was
not necessary that a judgment be rendered against the defendant be-
fore the court could properly refuse litigation expenses. Diamond v.
Diamond, 307 N.Y. 263, 120 N.E.2d 819 (1954).
At common law, a successful plaintiff in a corporate action or
stockholder's derivative action was usually entitled to recover reason-
able counsel fees and expenses,1 the amount of which was computed
by the trial judge. A rule developed whereby the judge would look
to the benefit derived by the corporation as a result of the action and
determine the recovery accordingly.2 If the corporation received no
benefit from the action the courts would refuse to grant expenses.
3
On the other hand, if the corporation received a large pecuniary
judgment,4 or if it was saved from a substantial loss,5 then the court
would be liberal in assessing the allowance. This rule became known
as the "benefit" rule.6
The same reasoning was applied to the allowance of counsel fees
and expenses to directors who successfully defended an action in a
derivative suit. In New York Dock Co. v. McCollum,7 in which
former Court of Appeals Judge Leonard Crouch acted as official ref-
eree, it was held that successful defendant-directors were not entitled
to reimbursement for expenses on the ground that the corporation
had received no benefit from the defense. The referee admitted the
I See Bysheim v. Miranda, 45 N.Y.S.2d 473, 475 (Sup. Ct. 1943) ; see 1945
LEG. Doc. No. 65(E), REPORT, N.Y. LAW REVISION COMMIssION 131, 140-141
(1945).
2 Hutchinson Box Board & Paper Co. v. Van Horn, 299 Fed. 424 (8th
Cir. 1924); Murphy v. North American Light & Power Co., 33 F. Supp. 567
(S.D. N.Y. 1940); Neuberger v. Barrett, 180 Misc. 222, 39 N.Y.S.2d 575
(Sup. Ct. 1942). Some courts require that the benefit to the corporation result
in a "fund" from which an allocation of expenses can be made. This is a too
limited view. See Bysheim v. Miranda, supra note 1; Neuberger v. Barrett,
supra.
3 Bank of America Nat. Trust & Savings Ass'n v. West End Chemical Co.,
37 Cal. App.2d 685, 100 P.2d 318 (1940) (action for declaratory relief);
Hildreth v. Western Realty Co., 62 N.D. 233, 242 N.W. 679 (1932).
4 See, e.g., Winkelman v. General Motors Corp., 48 F. Supp. 504, 514
(S.D. N.Y. 1942), aff'd sub noran. Singer v. General Motors Corp., 136 F.2d
905 (2d Cir. 1943) (Attorneys' fees totalled over one-half million dollars in
a case where the corporation benefited by a $4,500,000 cash settlement.);
Neuberger v. Barrett, supra note 2 (Corporation received a settlement of
$653,744 and the court awarded the plaintiffs $200,000.).
5 See, e.g., Bysheim v. Miranda, supra note 1 (The corporation was re-
quired to pay $500,000 in a settlement for a claim of $2,300,000. The court
allowed expenses to the plaintiffs inasmuch as the corporation received a
substantial benefit.); see also Hornstein, The Counsel Fee in Stockholder's
Derivative Suits, 39 CoL. L. REv. 784, 799 n.100 (1939).
6 See Legis., 20 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 67 (1945).
7 173 Misc. 106, 16 N.Y.S2d 844 (Sup. Ct. 1939).
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harshness of such a position but could think of no case wherein the
corporation could be benefited by such a defense. Other jurisdictions
refused to follow this reasoning.8
It is not difficult to appreciate the injustice and evils resulting
from such a decision. The directors, because of the lack of personal
funds, were denied adequate counsel in defending such actions. 9 Fear
of personal liability in defending costly actions discouraged capable
individuals from becoming directors. 10
As a result of the McCollum case, the legislature enacted pro-
visions authorizing reimbursement of litigation expenses for directors.
Two separate provisions were enacted.' Section 27-a of the General
Corporation Law authorized indemnity by contract embodied in the
certificate of incorporation, the by-laws or by resolution, the only
limitation being that the directors have not been adjudged liable for
negligence or misconduct. Section 61-a of the same law did not
require any such express contract right; rather it permitted a suc-
cessful defendant-director to petition the courts directly for the
awarding of "special costs," the qualification here being that he be
"successful in whole or in part." If it had been the intention of the
legislature to completely abolish the "benefit" theory it was not en-
tirely successful. Courts still applied it in matters concerning
settlements.' 2
In 1945, the Law Revision Commission re-appraised these two
sections, pointed out inconsistencies and made recommendations to
clarify and expand the previous provisions.13 In the same year, the
legislature followed the recommendations of the Commission; it
amended and renumbered Section 27-a, repealed Section 61-a and
enacted Sections 63-68 of the General Corporation Law.' 4 It was
under these sections that the old common-law "benefit" rule received
its death blow,15 as Section 67 specifically provided for settlements.
The courts thereafter abandoned the "benefit" rule and inter-
preted the laws as requiring a mandatory allocation to successful de-
fendants, with but one exception, i.e., that the directors not be
adjudged negligent or guilty of misconduct.
In Dornan v. Humphrey,16 the stockholder's action was dis-
missed on a plea of statute of limitations. The trial court refused
8 Solimine v. Hollander, 129 N.J. Eq. 264, 19 A.2d 344 (Ch. 1941). See
PRASHKER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS 804 (2d1 ed.
1949).9 See Solimine v. Hollander, smpra note 8, 19 A.2d at 348.10 Ibid.
" Laws of N.Y. 1941, c. 209; Laws of N.Y. 1941, c. 350, § 1.
12 See, e.g., Neuberger v. Barrett, 180 Misc. 222, 227-228, 39 N.Y.S.2d 575,
580 (Sup. Ct. 1942).
13 See 1945 LEG. Doc. No. 65(E), REPORT, N.Y. LAW REVISION ComuImSSoN
131 (1945).
14 Laws of N.Y. 1945, c. 869, §§ 1, 2, 4.
15 See Legis., 20 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 67, 69 (1945).i6 100 N.Y.S.2d 684 (Sup. Ct. 1950).
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to grant expenses on the ground that there had been no trial of the
issues. The Appellate Division reversed,17 holding that the defen-
dant was successful, and, as the case did not come under the above
noted exception, recovery was mandatory. Similarly, the court in
Tichner v. Andrews's held that the directors were entitled to recover
expenses in an action which was dismissed because of the failure of
the plaintiff to post security under Section 61-b of the General Cor-
poration Law.
The Court of Appeals has expressed reluctance to give this man-
datory rule a liberal interpretation, declaring that because the statute
is in derogation of the common law it must be strictly construed.
This attitude was first expressed in the case of Matter of Schwarz v.
General Aniline & Film Corp.19 wherein a defendant-director sought
reimbursement from the corporation after pleading nolo contendere
to a charge of violating the anti-trust laws. The lower courts refused
to allow any recovery in this action on the basis that such a plea con-
stituted a sufficient adjudication of misconduct and was therefore
within the exception.20  The Court of Appeals affirmed but on other
grounds. Rather than apply the exception the court looked at the
legislative intent, and held that the section was never intended to
encompass criminal actions.
The instant case presented a similar problem. The lower courts
felt compelled to allow the defendant to recover as there was no ques-
tion that the action was "successful" within the meaning of Section
67; 21 nor was the defendant "adjudged" guilty of misconduct.22 The
Court of Appeals, however, as in the Schwarz case, looked to the
legislative intent and, by applying a strict interpretation to the use
of the word "adjudged," determined that the statute did not require
a judgment to be rendered against the defendant.23
It is to be noted that the holding in the instant case is in no way
in conflict with prior decisions. There are no new exceptions created
to the mandatory rule nor are there new restrictions imposed. The
decision does, however, broaden the scope of the recognized exception.
27 278 App. Div. 1010, 106 N.Y.S.2d 142 (4th Dep't 1951), modified, 279
App. Div. 1040, 112 N.Y.S2d 585 (4th Dep't 1952).
18 193 Misc. 1050, 85 N.Y.S.2d 760 (Sup. Ct. 1949).
'9 305 N.Y. 395, 113 N.E.2d 533 (1953), 28 ST. JoHN's L. Rav. 115.
20 198 Misc. 1046, 102 N.Y.S.2d 325 (Sup. Ct. 1951), aff'd iner., 279 App.
Div. 996, 112 N.Y.S.2d 146 (1st Dep't 1952).
21 In Dorn v. Humphrey, the court construed the word "successful," as
used in Section 67, as not requiring the defendants to be exonerated of claims
of negligence or misconduct; rather, the test was whether or not a judgment
was rendered in his favor, either by a trial of the issues or by a dismissal of
the complaint. 278 App. Div. 1010, 106 N.Y.S.2d 142 (4th Dep't 1951), modified,
279 App. Div. 1040, 112 N.Y.S.2d 585 (4th Dep't 1952).
22 Diamond v. Diamond, 200 Misc. 1074, 108 N.Y.S.2d 864 (Sup. Ct. 1951),
aff'd mer., 281 App. Div. 1015, 121 N.Y.S.2d 280 (1st Dep't 1953).
23 Diamond v. Diamond, 307 N.Y. 263, 120 N.E.2d 819 (1954).
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In this case the extension was unquestionably justified. The
basis for this decision may be best determined by the language used
by the Court, when it states "[s] o unconscionable a result, so unfor-
tunate a preference of one wrongdoer over another, should not be
countenanced if there be any escape therefrom." 24 The Court, with
this in mind, seized upon the word "adjudged," and, by strict con-
struction, held that the defendant was sufficiently adjudged a
wrongdoer.
The instant case points out the inadequacy of the existing statute.
There is no question that the defendant-director should not have been
entitled to litigation expenses, but it was only through a strained
interpretation that the court could arrive at a just result. While the
decision might be regarded by some as a wedge in the door of the
"mandatory" rule, the statute will continue to work an injustice in
a great many cases. It seems most unjust that an erring director
should be entitled to expenses from the corporation which he has
harmed, merely because a stockholder fails to meet the requirements
of Section 61-b of the General Corporation Law, or because the stat-
ute of limitations has run.
Legislation should be enacted providing that the court be em-
powered to inquire into the facts, and where it is clear that such
directors have been guilty of misconduct, that they be precluded from
recovering counsel fees. The California statute 2 5 might well serve
as a model for such legislation. Care should be taken, however, not
to make the rule so stringent that the evils existing under the "benefit"
rule would once more return.26
CORPORATIONS- REMOVAL OF DIRECTORS AS INHERENT RIGHT
OF STOCKHOLDERS.-A proceeding under Article 78 of the New York
Civil Practice Act was brought for an order in the nature of
mandamus I to compel the defendant, president of a corporation, to
call a stockholders' meeting. Among other reasons, petitioners sought
the meeting to enable the shareholders to vote upon a proposal to
hear charges against some of the directors and, if cause were shown,
24 Id. at 266, 120 N.E.2d at 820.
25 CAr_ Coap. CDE § 830 (Deering, 1953). This Section provides that in
addition to being successful in whole or in part, the court must find that his
conduct fairly and equitably merits such indemnity.
26 See notes 9 and 10 supra.
1 New York, in 1937, abolished the proceeding of mandamus. See
PRAsHKER, NEw YoRK PRAcric 825 (3d ed. 1954). Today, an action which
would have been brought by this proceeding is governed by Article 78 of the
New York Civil Practice Act.
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